Welcome to the depths of the ocean...an ocean which have been created by strategies. The book Blue Ocean Strategy is the brain child of W. Chan Kim and Renee Mauborgne. The authors tries to segregate the markets into two parts the first being the Blue Ocean and the latter being the Red Ocean. Blue Ocean Strategy is a way to make the competition irrelevant by creating a leap in value for both the company and its customers. The terms red and blue oceans to describe the market universe. Red oceans are all the industries in existence today—the known market space. In the red oceans, industry boundaries are defined and accepted, and the competitive rules of the game are known. Here companies try to outperform their rivals to grab a greater share of existing demand. As the market space gets crowded, prospects for profits and growth are reduced. Products become commodities, and cutthroat competition turns the red ocean bloody. Hence, the term “red” oceans.
Blue oceans, in contrast, denote all the industries not in existence today—the unknown market space, untainted by competition. In blue oceans, demand is created rather than fought over. There is ample opportunity for growth that is both profitable and rapid. In blue oceans, competition is irrelevant because the rules of the game are waiting to be set. Blue ocean is an analogy to describe the wider, deeper potential of market space that is not yet explored. Like the “blue” ocean, it is vast, deep, powerful, in terms of profitable growth, and infinite.
But the question here lies that how does blue ocean strategy fundamentally differ from red ocean strategy?
To sustain themselves in the marketplace, red ocean strategists focus on building advantages over the competition, usually by assessing what competitors do and striving to do it better. Here, grabbing a bigger share of a finite market is seen as a zero-sum game in which one company’s gain is achieved at another company’s loss. They focus on dividing up the red ocean, where growth is increasingly limited. Such strategic thinking leads firms to divide industries into attractive and unattractive ones and to decide accordingly whether or not to enter. Blue ocean strategists recognize that market boundaries exist only in managers’ minds, and they do not let existing market structures limit their thinking. To them, extra demand is out there, largely untapped. The crux of the problem is how to create it. This, in turn, requires a shift of attention from supply to demand, from a focus on competing to a focus on creating innovative value to unlock new demand. This is achieved via the simultaneous pursuit of differentiation and low-cost. Under blue ocean strategy, there is scarcely an attractive or unattractive industry per
se because the level of industry attractiveness can be altered through companies’ conscientious efforts. As market structure is changed by breaking the value/cost tradeoff, so are the rules of the game. Competition in the old game is therefore rendered irrelevant. By expanding the demand side of the economy new wealth is created. Such a strategy therefore allows firms to largely play a non–zero-sum game, with high payoff possibilities.
Blue and red oceans have always coexisted and always will. Practical reality, therefore, demands that companies understand the strategic logic of both types of oceans. At present, however, competing in red oceans dominates the field of strategy in theory and in practice. Part of the reason traces back to the historical foundation of business strategy—war—where territory is defined and limited and opponents compete to protect and enlarge their share of limited and existing terrain. This focus on beating the competition in existing market space was exasperated by the meteoric rise of the Japanese in the 1970s and 1980s. Faced with mounting competition in the global marketplace as, for virtually the first time incorporate history, customers were deserting Western companies in droves, the center of strategic thinking gravitated further towards the competition. A slew of competition-based strategies emerged which argued that competition is at the core of the success and failure of firms, and that competition determines the appropriateness of a firm’s activities that can contribute to its performance.
What BLUE OCEAN STRATEGY seeks to do is to make the creation and capturing of blue oceans as systematic and actionable as competing in the red waters of known market space. For although blue ocean strategists have always existed, for the most part their strategies have been largely unconscious. Blue ocean strategy seeks to remedy this by not only decoding the pattern and principles behind the successful creation of blue oceans, but also providing the ana lytical frameworks and tools to act on this insight.
Now let us understand the fact that whether this strategy is actually helpful or not in the present context.
Prospects in most established market spaces—red oceans—are shrinking steadily. Technological advances have substantially improved industrial productivity, permitting suppliers to produce an unprecedented array of products and services. And as trade barriers between nations and regions fall and information on products and prices becomes instantly and globally available, niche markets and monopoly havens are continuing to disappear. At the same time, there is little
evidence of any increase in demand, at least in the developed markets, where recent United Nations statistics even point to declining populations. The result is that in more and more industries, supply is overtaking demand. This situation has inevitably hastened the commoditization of products and services, stoked price wars, and shrunk profit margins. According to recent studies, major American brands in a variety of product and service categories have become more and more alike. And as brands become more similar, people increasingly base purchase choices on price. People no longer insist, as in the past, that their laundry detergent be Tide. Nor do they necessarily stick to Colgate when there is a special promotion for Crest, and vice versa. In overcrowded industries, differentiating brands becomes harder both in economic upturns and in downturns.
Is blue ocean strategy applicable to all types industries including businesses that are several steps upstream from consumers?
Yes, blue ocean strategy applies across all types of industries from the typical suspects of consumer product goods to b2b, industrial, pharmaceutical, financial services, entertainment, IT, and even defense. BLUE OCEAN STRATEGY drives this point home by highlighting a rich array of companies creating blue oceans across diverse, and unexpected, industry domains from NetJets in jet travel, to NABI in the municipal bus industry, to Cemex in cement, to Joint Striker Fighter in defense, to Cirque du Soleil in entertainment. Our experience further suggests two interesting findings with respect to businesses several steps removed from the final consumer. First, companies in these industries tend to view their businesses as commodity businesses with little room to offer innovative value. This has effectively created a self- fulfilling prophecy in that the more these companies view their businesses as commodities, the more they treat their businesses as such. Secondly, we observed that the more removed companies are from the final
customer, the more levers there are to unlock innovative value as every company in that chain can be viewed as a customer. If a company can’t see an opportunity to unlock innovative value for the next direct customer in that chain, there are still opportunities to unlock innovative value for that customer’s customers, and so forth.
Last but not the least lest us ask that whether Blue Ocean Strategy new one or not?
Although the term blue oceans is new, their existence is not. They are a feature of business life, past and present. Look back one hundred years and ask yourself, how many of today’s industries were then unknown? The answer: many industries as basic as automobiles, music recording, aviation, petrochemicals, health care, and management consulting were unheard of or had just begun to emerge at the time. Now turn the clock back only thirty years. Again, a plethora of multibilliondollar industries jumps out—mutual funds, cell phones, gas- fired electricity plants, biotechnology, discount retail, express delivery, minivans, snowboards, coffee bars, and home videos to name a few. Just three decades ago, none of these industries existed in a meaningful way. Now put the clock forward twenty years—or perhaps fifty years—and ask yourself how many now unknown industries will likely exist then. If history is any predictor of the future, the answer is many of them.
